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STOP KICKING THE CAN DOWN THE ROAD: AN
URGENT CALL TO SAVE THE UNITED STATES FROM 
NUCLEAR DISPOSAL
“We have a moral and national security obligation to come up with 
a long-term solution, finding the safest repositories available . . . we 
can no longer kick the can down the road.”
-Rick Perry, United States Secretary of Energy1
I. INTRODUCTION
The year is 2040. The United States has implemented evacuation drills 
for high-risk areas surrounded by nuclear waste. The students of Suncrest 
Middle School are accustomed to, and even excited about, their monthly 
evacuation drills cancelling class for the day. As the parents drop their 
children off today, they have no idea it will be their last moment together. 
Today is not a drill. The nearby stored nuclear waste has overflowed, and 
the students will not make it.
The United States stands on the brink of a nuclear crisis. When most 
Americans hear “nuclear crisis,” they immediately assume foreign nuclear 
attack. In reality, the United States has created a nuclear waste2 field 
throughout the country that proves just as dangerous as any potential 
nuclear war. Sixty-one commercial nuclear power plants operate in the 
United States with two more currently under construction.3 Since the 
emergence of nuclear energy as a clean energy resource in the 1950s, these 
sixty-one plants in the United States have produced over 80,000 metric 
tons of nuclear waste.4
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1. Jeremy Dillon, Yucca Mountain compromise bill advanced by Energy 
and Commerce Committee, CQ Roll Call, 2017 WL 2786391.
2. Much of the nuclear waste produced is radioactive and, therefore, must 
be carefully managed as hazardous material. Radioactive waste includes any 
material that is either intrinsically radioactive or contaminated by radioactivity, 
and that is deemed to have no further use. Nuclear Waste Management, WORLD 
NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION (Apr. 2018), https://perma.cc/F938-7APS.
3. How many Nuclear Power Plants Are in the United States, and Where 
are They Located?, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(Aug. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/3VX6-3UD2.
4. Nuclear energy generates heat from fission producing no greenhouse 
gases or emissions associated with acid rain or urban smog. Using more nuclear 
energy gives states additional flexibility in complying with clean air requirements. 
Protecting the Environment, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., https://perma.cc/75ND-
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The United States Government continues to grapple with how to 
handle this mounting problem.5 Congress attempted to tackle the waste 
issue with the enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) in 
1982, which launched the search for a permanent geologic nuclear waste 
repository.6 In 1987, Congress amended the NWPA, designating Yucca 
Mountain, located ninety miles northwest of Las Vegas, as the sole 
candidate for a repository.7 The designation of Yucca Mountain has 
provoked much backlash from Nevada residents and politicians since its 
selection as the permanent site decades ago.8 Battling factions have caused 
the nuclear waste dilemma to remain unsolved. With nuclear waste piling 
up in America’s backyard, Congress must act now to save America from 
its own nuclear destruction. 
The current federal nuclear power plant waste disposal process relies 
on alternative methods to deal with nuclear waste. Under the Federal 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the federal government is responsible 
                                                                                                            
3FBB (last visited Sept. 17, 2017); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-17-
340, Commercial Nuclear Waste: Resuming Licensing of the Yucca Mountain 
Repository Would Require Rebuilding Capacity at DOE and NRC, Among Other 
Key Steps, U.S GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (Apr. 26, 2017), https://
perma.cc/6AUU-RJQV.
5. Charles de Saillan, Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States 
and Europe: A Persistent Environmental Problem, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 461, 
485 (2011).
6. Alex Funk and Benjamin Sovacool, Wasted Opportunities: Resolving the 
impasse in United States Nuclear Waste Policy, 34 ENERGY L.J. 113, 115 (2013); 
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101(18) (defining “repository”), 10131(b)(2) (establishing 
federal responsibility for high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel), 
10222(a)(5)(B) (“[B]eginning not later than January 31, 1998, [the Secretary] will 
dispose of the high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel . . . .”); Robert 
Vandenbosch & Susanne E. Vandenbosch, Nuclear Waste Stalemate: Political 
and Scientific Controversies 60 (2007). “While a geologic repository may take 
many forms, in layman’s terms, the geologic repository envisioned by the NWPA 
is essentially a natural rock storage zone into which cylindrical containers of 
radioactive waste will be inserted and buried.” See Megan Easley, Standing in 
Nuclear Waste: Challenging the Disposal of Yucca Mountain, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 659, 661 (2012); See also David Bodansky, Nuclear Energy: Principles, 
Practices, and Prospects 266-67 (2d ed. 2004).
7. Funk and Sovacool, supra note 6, at 116. 
8. See Marta Adams, Yucca Mountain—Nevada’s Perspective, 46 IDAHO L.
REV. 423 (2010); See also Gary Martin, Yucca Mountain opposition to be focus at 
Las Vegas conference, LAS VEGAS REVIEW JOURNAL (Sept. 5, 2017), https://perma
.cc/FD4N-9KL5.
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for management of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF)9 from fuel processing
described by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).10 Congress can 
and should amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to allow private 
companies to construct and operate large interim storage facilities for 
commercial nuclear use, granted the Energy Department also assumes
liability for the waste.11 By allowing private companies to create large 
interim storage facilities, Congress gains more time to find a permanent 
repository and tackle the nation’s nuclear waste problem. 
Considering the massive amount of taxpayer dollars invested in Yucca 
Mountain, Congress needs independent regulators to determine whether 
the site passes all safety and environmental screenings before completely 
deciding against the location. If the independent regulators deem Yucca 
Mountain unfit to house the nation’s nuclear waste, the United States 
should abandon the project and search for an alternative permanent 
repository. 
Given that an agreement seems unlikely, the United States cannot wait 
for the government to decide on the viability of Yucca Mountain before 
allowing consolidated interim storage facilities, because an agreement 
seems unlikely. An alternative avenue the United States should take with 
regards to spent nuclear fuel is reprocessing.12 Of course, a major 
drawback of fuel reprocessing, and the reason the U.S. is hesitant to 
consider it, stems from weapons proliferation.13 Although weapons 
proliferation worries many Americans, France has used fuel reprocessing 
                                                                                                            
9. Spent Nuclear Fuel is composed of highly radioactive nuclear by-
products, some of which have half-lives spanning thousands of years. Emily 
Casey, Waist-Deep in Nuclear Waste: How the NRC Can Rebuild Confidence in 
a Stalled Waste Management Program, 33 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY
723, 727 (2013).
10. Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2205 (1983), codified in 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
10101-10270; 42. U.S.C.A. § 10131.
11. Daniel Bloom, Texas Firm applies for nuclear waste license, hopes to 
spur Congress to Act, CQ ROLL CALL, 2016 WL 1711494.
12. “Reprocessing is a series of chemical operations that separates plutonium 
and uranium from other nuclear waste contained in the used (or “spent”) fuel from
nuclear power reactors. The separated plutonium can be used to fuel reactors.” 
Nuclear Reprocessing: Dangerous, Dirty, and Expensive, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS, https://perma.cc/Q3ZZ-VQSN (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
13. Richard Burleson Stewart & Jane Bloom Stewart, Fuel Cycle to 
Nowhere: U.S. Law and Policy on Nuclear Waste, VANDERBILT UNIV. PRESS 19, 
46 (2012).
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without major issues, supporting the idea that the United States should 
follow France’s lead to implement fuel reprocessing. 14
Part I of this Comment illustrates why and how the NWPA must be 
amended to solve the nation’s growing nuclear waste crisis. Part II will 
introduce the history and legal background of nuclear waste disposal,
focusing on Yucca Mountain and the NWPA. This part will review the 
crisis over the years, explaining how it has progressed to the present-day. 
Part III will discuss the NWPA and the current private companies seeking 
nuclear waste licenses. Additionally, this part will focus on the 2017 
Yucca Mountain compromise bill to demonstrate the importance of 
allowing private companies to open interim waste facilities. Part IV will 
address the liability of private facilities and whether the Price Anderson 
Act should apply to private interim facilities. Finally, Part V will evaluate
the necessity of revamping the U.S. nuclear waste reprocessing program 
and the possibility of following in the footsteps of countries such as France 
that have paved the way in nuclear reprocessing.
II. THE DAWN OF NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL
The history of the United States’ nuclear energy crisis spans back to 
the 1950s when nuclear energy first emerged as an alternative energy 
source to fossil fuels. While this new source provided a clean alternative 
to fossil fuels, a new concern surfaced: uncertainty over proper storage and 
disposal of waste produced by nuclear energy. The Nuclear Waste Policy 
Act of 1985 attempted to answer the problem with the selection of Yucca 
Mountain as a permanent repository for the nuclear waste. Since the 
emergence of the nuclear waste storage problem, the federal government 
has spent over thirty years attempting to reach a solution, and the Yucca 
Mountain repository has yet to be constructed.
A. The Early Years of Nuclear Energy 
With the advent of nuclear energy as a clean source of electric power 
in the 1950s, the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 primarily 
concentrated on the development of nuclear energy in a safe manner.15
Congress amended the AEA in 1959 to clarify that the federal government 
                                                                                                            
14. Emily Farah, Reviving Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing in the U.S., 16
U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 183, 184 (2016). 
15. Steven Melzer, Nuclear Stalemate: Indefinite Above-Ground Storage is a 
temporary, Albeit Safe Band-Aid for a Serious Wound, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
847, 849 (2015). 
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had the sole authority to regulate nuclear power.16 The United States 
Legislature passed the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, creating the 
Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC), and charging it with the 
management of reactor facilities. These facilities created nuclear energy.17
Federal law expressly prohibits the NRC from ceding or sharing its 
regulatory authority over matters such as the construction and operations 
of facilities, the export and import of nuclear material, and the disposal of 
nuclear materials.18
Five years after the creation of the NRC, the first major nuclear 
catastrophe, The Three Mile Island, occurred in the United States, 
catalyzing the public’s fear of nuclear power. The Three Mile Island 
transpired in 1979 near Middletown, Pennsylvania, where a reactor melted 
down and released radioactive material.19 Although there were no 
detectable health effects from the incident, it stoked fear in the United 
States over nuclear proliferation.20 While incidents like The Three Mile 
Island Incident remain a concern, the NRC’s focus has shifted away from 
reactor operation risks and toward the more pressing issue of dealing with 
the massive amount of spent fuel and radioactive waste piling up at 
facilities across the nation.21
B. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act and Yucca Mountain 
In 1982, Congress passed the NWPA22 to address the issue of waste 
disposal.23 The NWPA provided the framework for selecting a permanent 
geologic repository to store the country’s nuclear waste.24 The Department 
                                                                                                            
16. 42. U.S.C.A. § 2021 (1962).
17. NRC began operation in 1975. Steven Melzer, Nuclear Stalemate: 
Indefinite Above-Ground Storage is a temporary, Albeit Safe Band-Aid for a Serious 
Wound, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 847, 850 (2015); Melzer, supra note 15, at 850.
18. 42. U.S.C.A. § 2021(c) (2004).
19. Background on the Three Mile Island Incident, U.S. NUCLEAR REG.
COMM’N (Dec. 12, 2014), https://perma.cc/WW27-3JCC.
20. Id. “Its aftermath brought about sweeping changes involving emergency 
response planning, reactor operator training, human factors engineering, radiation 
protection, and many other areas of nuclear power plant operations. It also caused 
the NRC to tighten and heighten its regulatory oversight. All of these changes 
significantly enhanced U.S. reactor safety.” 
21. Melzer, supra note 15, at 851.
22. Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 STAT. 2205 (1983), codified in 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
10101-10270.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(2) (2012) (“[A] National problem has been created 
by the accumulation of [A] spent nuclear fuel from the nuclear reactors”).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 10132.
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of Energy (DOE) conducted a search for a permanent repository with a 
plan to present its findings to President Reagan.25 The DOE provided three 
locations for the President to choose from: the Hanford Nuclear 
Reservation in Washington; a salt formation in Texas; and Yucca 
Mountain in Nevada.26 Due to strong congressional clout held by Texas 
and Washington, along with favorable environmental conditions, Nevada 
quickly became the only possible location for the permanent repository.27
On December 17, 1987, Congress amended the NWPA and designated 
Yucca Mountain as the sole location for a repository site.28
Congress decided on Yucca Mountain, not just as a result of political 
pressure, but also because of the lack of human population, dry climate, 
and low precipitation rates.29 These considerations are crucial for the 
sustainability of a permanent repository, because water is the primary 
mechanism by which radioactive particles may be transported from the 
repository.30 Geologic disposal involves the placement of carefully 
packaged radioactive waste in tunnels underneath the Earth’s surface, with 
several layers of protection to ensuring the particles do not escape.31
Naturally-occurring, thick, unsaturated rock and man-made barriers work 
to prevent the SNF from moving inside the repository.32
Despite the positive aspects, many problems exist with the selection 
of Yucca Mountain as a permanent repository: the area is prone to 
earthquakes; there is evidence of recent volcanic activity; and the 
repository is located thousands of miles from most of the accumulating 
                                                                                                            
25. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10132(b)-(c); See also Melzer, supra note 15, at 851.
26. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/S-0048, Recommendation by the Secretary 
of Energy of Candidate Sites for the First Radioactive-Waste Repository at 1, 9 
(1986).
27. If Not Yucca Mountain, then what? An Alternative Plan for Managing 
Highly Radioactive Waste in the United States, INST. FOR ENERGY AND ENVTL.
RESEARCH, https://perma.cc/5E35-2KB8 (last visited Sept. 7, 2018).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 10172(a); Debra J. Carfora, Building a Sustainable Energy 
Future: Offering a solution to the Nuclear Waste Disposal Problem Through 
Reprocessing and the Rebirth of Yucca Mountain, 8 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY 
L. 143, 155 (2012).
29. Annemarie Wall, Going Nowhere in the Nuke of Time: Breach of the Yucca 
Contract, Nuclear Waste Policy Act Fallout and Shelter in Private Interim Storage,
12 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 138, 162 (2007); Alejandro Gomez, Issues 
Surrounding Proposal for Nuclear Waste Repository at Yucca Mountain, INDIANA 
UNIV. EARTH & ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES, https://perma.cc/QVH9-NMAG (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2017).
30. Id.
31. Wall, supra note 29, at 163.
32. Id.
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waste.33 The volatile nature of Yucca Mountain could potentially result in 
the radioactive waste escaping from the permanent repository. 
Additionally, the large distance of the reactor sites from Yucca Mountain 
creates the additional problem of transferring the waste such great 
distances through multiple jurisdictions. The DOE will likely implement 
a combination of rail, road, and barge, using vast, sealed containers34 to 
transport the nuclear waste to the permanent repository.35 The current rule 
regarding SNF only allows shipment along specified routes with NRC 
approval and notification to state officials through which the shipments 
travel.36 Before allowing the selection of Yucca Mountain, the DOE 
should address these issues. 
To this day, the 1987 NWPA amendments prohibit the DOE from 
constructing any consolidated interim storage facility for commercial 
nuclear waste until a license has been granted for the permanent geologic 
repository.37 In 1987, Congress believed that these restrictions blocked the 
potential undermining of the development of a geologic repository.38 By 
not allowing consolidated interim storage until the granting of the license 
for a permanent repository, proponents of the bill hoped to prevent its 
detractors from thwarting the creation. If consolidated interim storage 
facilities could not be created without the license, Congress believed 
political pressure would force an agreement regarding the location for a 
permanent repository. Thirty years’ hindsight has proven otherwise, as a 
license for a permanent repository still does not exist.
The NWPA required the DOE to enter into contracts for the disposal 
of radioactive waste and to begin accepting fuel at Yucca Mountain by 
January 31, 1998.39 These contracts formed the basis of the Nuclear Waste 
Fund (NWF) and contained fee provisions that would go toward the 
                                                                                                            
33. See Marta Adams, Yucca Mountain—Nevada’s Perspective, 46 IDAHO L.
REV. 423, 425-426 (2010).
34. “Containers must be able to withstand a sequence of crashes, fire and 
submersion in water without breaking open. The approved containers are massive, 
weighing between 25 tons and 40 tons for truck shipments and between 75 tons 
and 125 tons for rail shipments. Multiple layers of steel and other materials 
confine the radioactivity. Typically, for every ton of fuel, there are more than three 
tons of protective shielding.” Transportation of Used Nuclear Fuel, NUCLEAR 
ENERGY INST., https://perma.cc/DC6Q-33QH (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 10165(b), 10168(d)(1).
38. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 13, at 67. 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 10222(c). 
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creation of the proposed permanent repository.40 The acceptance date
depended upon the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA), NRC’s, 
and President’s timely completion of preliminary duties, including the 
creation of regulations with which the DOE must thereafter be in 
compliance.41 Specifically, the EPA had to promulgate rules protecting the 
environment from the release of radioactive materials in repositories.42
The NRC had to create rules regarding the training of nuclear power plant 
operators.43 The President had to consider Yucca Mountain as a qualified 
repository and make a recommendation to Congress.44 Congress believed 
the 1998 date allowed the completion of all of the assigned duties. 
Two years before the 1998 deadline, the DOE attempted to default on 
the contract.45 The fee-paying parties of the nuclear waste fund quickly 
petitioned for review.46 Although courts tend to provide agencies much 
deference, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit confirmed the 
DOE’s unconditional obligation to dispose of the waste beginning January 
31, 1998.47 When the deadline passed, the fee-paying parties sued the 
agency. Courts have consistently ruled in favor of the fee-paying 
generators.48
Because the DOE failed to establish a geologic repository, the D.C. 
Circuit ordered the DOE to submit a proposal to Congress, changing the 
fee to zero, which effectively stopped the DOE from collecting any money 
                                                                                                            
40. These fees were initially set at 1 mill (0.1 cents) per kilowatt-hour of 
nuclear electricity produced. Report to the Secretary of Energy, BLUE RIBBON 
COMM’N ON AM.’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, 9, 70 (2012); See 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(1) 
(2000).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 10141(a). 42 U.S.C. § 10266. 42 U.S.C. § 10134(a)(1), (2). 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 10141(a).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 10266.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 10134(a)(1), (2).
45. Department of Energy Final Interpretation of Nuclear Waste Acceptance 
Issues, 60 FED. REG. 21793, 21794 (May 3, 1995).
46. See Indiana Mich. Power Co. v. Dep’t of Energy & United States, 88 F.3d 
1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
47. The formulation of procedures should basically be left within the 
discretion of the agencies to which Congress has confided the responsibility for 
substantive judgments. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 
U.S. 519, 523-525 (1978); See Indiana Mich. Power Co. 88 F.3d at 1277. 
48. E.g., Sacramento Mun. Util Dist. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 180, 181 
(Fed. Cl. 2005); Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. United States, No. 00-697 (Fed. Cl. 
2004); Tenn. Valley Auth. V. United States, 60 Fed Cl. 665 (Fed. Cl. 2004); 
Southern Nuclear Operating Co. v. United States, No. 98-614 (Fed. Cl. 2004); Fla. 
Power & Light Co. v. United States, No. 98-486 (Fed. Cl. 2002); Commonwealth 
Edison Co. v. United States, No. 98-484 (Fed. Cl. 2001).
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for the NWF.49 Upon termination of the fee, the NWF valued at over $36 
billion.50 The DOE cannot use private interim storage to meet its obligation 
to take title to the waste without a licensed permanent repository.51 In order 
to remedy the DOE’s breach of contract and allow the use of private 
interim storage, Congress must amend the NWPA to specifically allow the 
use of private interim storage despite the lack of a licensed permanent
repository. 
C. Presidential Authority
The DOE formally presented a license application for Yucca 
Mountain to the NRC in 2008, citing the massive amount of money, 
research, and time spent securing Yucca Mountain as a repository site.52
The DOE concluded that Yucca Mountain could safely act as the nation’s
permanent repository after spending fourteen billion dollars for design, 
engineering, and testing activities of Yucca Mountain.53 The NRC 
conducted a two-prong review of the application by assessing the technical 
merits of the repository design, deciding whether to issue a construction 
authorization for the repository, and adjudicating hearings by the NRC’s
Construction Authorization Board to consider technical and legal 
challenges to the application.54
                                                                                                            
49. Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 736 
F.3d 517, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Richard B. Stewart & Jane B. Stewart, Solving 
the Spent Nuclear Fuel Impasse, 21 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2014).
50. See DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, The Department 
of Energy’s Nuclear Waste Fund Fiscal Year 2013 Financial Statements (Dec. 
2013).
51. Wall, supra note 29, at 144.
52. “After careful evaluation, I am convinced that the product of over 20 
years, millions of hours, and four billion dollars of research provides a sound 
scientific basis for concluding that the site can perform safely . . . and that it is 
indeed scientifically and technically suitable for development as a repository,” 
Recommendation by the Secretary of Energy Regarding the Suitability of the 
Yucca Mountain Site for a Repository under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1982, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY at 45 (2002). See generally U.S. NUCLEAR REG.
COMM’N, YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY LICENSE APPLICATION 
(LA) FOR CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION (June 3, 2008).
53. Nuclear Waste Management: Key Attributes, Challenges, and Costs for 
the Yucca Mountain Repository and Two Potential Alternatives, U.S. GOV.
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, https://perma.cc/C6FU-KYHH (last visited Jan. 18, 
2018). 
54. Yucca Mountain, ENERGY AND COMMERCE, https://perma.cc/T5GH-
LWBZ (last visited Jan. 16, 2018).
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A year later, on March 5, 2009, the Secretary of Energy under newly-
elected President Obama, Steven Chu, confirmed in a committee hearing 
that Yucca Mountain was no longer a candidate for a nuclear repository 
site. The Obama Administration had taken an anti-Yucca stance.55 The 
DOE submitted a motion to withdraw the licensing of Yucca Mountain to 
the NRC’s Construction Authorization Board; however, the DOE did not 
concede that Yucca was defective or unsafe.56 The DOE’s motion stated 
that it “reaffirm[ed] its obligation to take possession and dispose of the 
nation’s spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste, but the Secretary 
of Energy has decided that . . . Yucca Mountain is not a workable 
option.”57 The motion to withdraw failed on procedural grounds.58 The 
NRC Construction Authorization Board stated that the NWPA mandated 
a resolution on the merits by the NRC, a process the Secretary of Energy 
could not override this process.59
On January 11, 2013, the DOE announced a proposed plan to have a 
pilot facility for the interim storage of used fuel from shutdown reactor 
sites operational by 2021, a larger interim storage facility completed by 
2025, and a final geologic repository by 2048.60 The DOE published this 
report in response to the recommendations from President Obama’s Blue 
Ribbon Commission (BRC).61 The BRC discussed consent-based facilities 
including system design and funding.62
                                                                                                            
55. Full Committee Hearing: To Receive Testimony Regarding Draft 
Legislative Proposals on Energy Research and Development (SH-216) Before the 
S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 111th Cong. (2009)(statement of 
Steven Chu, Secretary of Energy) (indicating the DOE’s disapproval of Yucca 
Mountain through discourse with Senator McCain), U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON 
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES (2009), https://perma.cc/U6C2-B9BU.
56. See U.S. Department of Energy’s Motion to Withdraw, In re U.S. Dep’t 
of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), ASLBP No. 09-892-HLW-CAB04 
(U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n Mar. 3, 2000). (No. 63-001).
57. See U.S. Department of Energy’s Motion to Withdraw, In re U.S. Dep’t 
of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), ASLBP No. 09-892-HLW-CAB04 
(U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n Mar. 3, 2000). (No. 63-001) at 1.
58. Id.
59. See In re U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 71 N.R.C. 609, 629 (2010) (“We 
Conclude that . . . DOE lacks authority to seek to withdraw the Application.”); 
Yucca Mountain, ENERGY AND COMMERCE, https://perma.cc/B4RB-GJVE, (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2018).
60. Steven Chu, Strategy for the Management & Disposal of Used Nuclear 
Fuel & High-level Radioactive Waste, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (2013) at 1,
https://perma.cc/S3Y9-7VND. 
61. Id. at 5.
62. Id. at 4.
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After the election of President Donald Trump, the DOE returned to 
Yucca Mountain as an option for a permanent repository location. 
President Trump’s 2018 budget proposal calls for $120 million to restart 
licensing procedures for the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository.63
Although the DOE shares power regarding the administration of the 
NWPA, the NRC independently holds the sole authority to determine 
whether the executive branch can terminate or continue the Yucca 
Mountain process.64
III. MOVING FORWARD WITH NUCLEAR WASTE IN 2018: SAVING 
AMERICA FROM NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION
While the selection of a permanent repository remains uncertain, the
federal government can no longer wait before accepting the nuclear waste 
sitting at locations all over the country. Congress should amend the NWPA 
to allow the use of consolidated interim facilities to store the nuclear waste 
until the government reaches a decision regarding a permanent repository. 
Private companies have petitioned for licensing of nuclear waste facilities, 
and the government should allow their creation. 
A. Consolidated Interim Facilities 
Since the government cannot reach a consensus about Yucca 
Mountain as a permanent repository, the United States should establish 
interim facilities to assume control of the nuclear waste. The United 
States’ inability to arrive at a unified solution to the nation’s nuclear waste 
crisis has resulted in a stockpile of nuclear waste remaining on-site at 
nuclear plants.65 Leaving the nuclear waste on-site raises safety concerns 
and hinders the locations’ ability to be used for other purposes in the 
future.66 Additionally, critics are concerned that the highly radioactive 
                                                                                                            
63. Ben Wolfgang, Trump’s Former Las Vegas Cohorts Gird Battle to Stop 
his Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Plan, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, (Aug. 6, 
2017), https://perma.cc/ZH48-VNR3 (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
64. See In re Aiken County, 645 F. 3d 428, 439 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) 
(“[Yucca is a mess because the executive agency (The Department of Energy) and 
the independent agency (the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have overlapping 
statutory responsibilities). See also Wolfgang at 443 (“[The President] is 
powerless to direct or supervise the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. . . .”).
65. Christopher Keegan, What’s worse, Nuclear Waste or the United States’ 
Failed Policy for its Disposal, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 1265, 1266 (2014).
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nuclear waste could be susceptible to terrorism and natural disasters.67 The 
federal government has failed to provide the nuclear power plants around 
the country with a permanent repository to consolidate and control the 
mounting nuclear waste. 
The federal government has consistently stated that storing nuclear 
waste on-site at the commercial nuclear plants is not dangerous.68 Former 
DOE Secretary Chu believed that dry cask storage69 at reactor sites could 
hold the spent nuclear waste while alternatives to Yucca were explored.70
Despite the government’s confidence about the safety of the nuclear waste 
remaining at the plant, the 2011 Fukushima incident demonstrates that 
dangerous incidents can occur. On March 11, 2011, a major earthquake 
caused a 15-metre tsunami to disable the power supply of three Fukushima 
Daiichi reactors, causing a nuclear crisis.71 By losing power supply, the 
nuclear reactors melted resulting in high radioactive release.72 By moving 
the nuclear waste to consolidated interim storage facilities, additional 
disasters could be avoided. 
In some instances of on-site storage, decommissioning of nuclear 
reactors has occurred.73 The licensees that own the reactors have removed 
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the facility from service by reducing the residual radioactivity of the site 
to a level that permits the license to be terminated.74 This means that the 
plants are simply used to store SNF.75 Because the sites are no longer 
generating any revenue from electricity production, the sites have the 
heavy burden of paying the maintenance and security costs that come with 
maintaining stored nuclear waste.76 By implementing interim facilities, the
decommissioned facilities would have a place to move their spent fuel, 
allowing the site to be used for other purposes. Due to the federal 
government being in breach of contract since 1998 for failure to take title 
to the nuclear waste overflowing around the Nation, establishing interim 
facilities would allow the government to begin meeting its obligation 
without having to wait for the construction of a permanent repository.77
Critics of the consolidated interim storage facilities contend there will 
be too much political opposition from local communities wherever the 
federal government decides to create the facilities.78 Additionally, the 
nuclear waste would have to be transported twice; first to the interim 
storage facility, and finally to the permanent repository.79 The United 
States Government Accountability Office estimated that an interim storage 
facility would take nineteen years to create and cost $23 billion to $81 
billion.80
The timeline to create an interim facility should jolt the United States 
into immediate action. A typical nuclear plant generates 20 metric tons of 
spent nuclear fuel per year. In total, the United States generates about 
2,000 to 2,300 metric tons of spent fuel per year.81 If the federal 
government waits for the permanent repository—Yucca Mountain or 
elsewhere—to be finished, the United States might already be inundated 
by nuclear waste. 
                                                                                                            
or Name), U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, https://perma.cc/DQF5-F5TR (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2017).
74. Joseph D. McManus, Lights Out: Decommissioning the American 
Nuclear Plant, 36 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 518, 519 (2016).
75. Id. at 540.
76. Id. at 544.
77. Stewart & Stewart, supra note 49, at 4.
78. Funk and Sovacool, supra note 6, at 138.
79. Id.
80. Nuclear Waste: Disposal Challenges and Lessons Learned from Yucca 
Mountain, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-731T, 12 (2011).
81. On-Site Storage of Nuclear Waste: Used Nuclear Fuel and High- Level 
Radioactive Waste, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., https://perma.cc/Y3XE-B8LH (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
258 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VII
In order to implement a plan for nuclear waste at an interim location, 
Congress must amend the NWPA to allow the implementation of an 
interim storage plan.82 As amended in 1987, the NWPA prohibits the 
construction of an interim storage facility until a geologic repository is 
licensed.83 Yucca Mountain is presently the only site that can be 
considered for a geologic repository due to the wording of the NWPA 
1987 amendment.84 Thus, Congress must amend or repeal the NWPA to 
allow the implementation of an interim storage plan.
B. Salvation on the Horizon: Yucca Mountain 2017 Compromise Bill 
On June 28, 2017, the House Energy and Commerce Committee 
advanced the Yucca Mountain compromise bill that aimed to break the 
partisan stalemate over nuclear waste. The bill proposed to restart the 
Energy Department and Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s efforts to 
license Nevada’s Yucca Mountain as a permanent repository for nuclear 
waste currently stored at United States power plants. The Energy and 
Commerce Committee approved it 49-4.85 Although many independent 
scientists have found Yucca Mountain to be an unsafe location for a 
permanent repository, the Trump Administration chose to move forward 
with the project.86 While still focusing on Yucca Mountain, the bill amends 
the NWPA to allow interim storage facilities, a necessity to ameliorate the 
nuclear waste crisis.87
The permanent repository at Yucca Mountain would expand the 
amount of waste that could be stored in the facility from 70,000 to 110,000 
metrics tons.88 The bill would also authorize temporary storage of nuclear 
waste at other sites, which attracted support from districts that are home to 
decommissioned nuclear power plants that continue to store radioactive 
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waste. Temporary storage offers a quicker, cheaper interim solution while 
Yucca undergoes years of review.89 The non-federal storage facilities 
created must hold the NRC license, and the project must have state and 
local support prior to entering a contract.90
The compromise would enable the Energy Department to move 
forward with a pilot temporary storage facility—authorizing $150 million 
for the process—and store waste at that location or one owned by a private 
company so long as the Yucca Mountain licensing process continues.91
The compromise does not tie the interim storage effort to a final approval 
for Yucca, as the original draft did.92 Connecting the two projects meant 
that interim storage facilities could not be created unless the creation of 
Yucca Mountain had commenced.93 The compromise bill would sever the 
link, placing the two on parallel, but not interdependent, tracks.94
Representative Scott Peters emphasized that “by continuing this linkage 
we are creating additional uncertainty that may undermine or dissuade a 
potential private entity from pursuing interim as a business model.”95 As 
such, the amendment to strike the linkage between Yucca and a 
consolidated interim solution is called the Peters Amendment. 
Yucca Mountain also presents a huge problem regarding Nevada’s
water rights. The federal government attempted to take Nevada’s water for 
Yucca Mountain. In July 1997, the DOE filed five applications with the 
office of the Nevada State Engineer “under provisions of state water law 
to permanently appropriate 430 acre-feet of groundwater in anticipation of 
a congressional decision authorizing” the DOE to seek NRC approval to 
construct and operate a “proposed high-level nuclear waste repository in 
Yucca Mountain.”96 As a general rule, state law governs the use of water 
within a state.97 The building of the permanent repository would require 
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the use of substantial amount of water, which Nevada deemed detrimental 
to public interest violating state water law. This compromise bill protects
Nevada’s sovereignty by removing a provision that would have stripped 
Nevada of its water and air permitting authority for the site.98
The proposed bill is not without its critics. Robert J. Halstead, 
Executive Director of the governor’s agency for nuclear projects, said the 
bill is still “Screw Nevada 2.”99 Opponents of the bill believe it will turn 
Nevada into America’s site for nuclear waste despite the new incentives 
proposed by the 2017 bill. Many supporters of the new bill believe it reads 
better for Nevada, but these supporters of the bill established provisions 
that prohibit nuclear waste storage in their own districts.100 States in the 
Great Lakes area approve of the bill but do not think the repository would 
be safe in their own states. This hypocrisy illustrates that states should 
have a voice when it comes to choosing a permanent repository that could 
affect its people for years to come.
1. Allowing the States to have a Say: The Introduction of the 
Consent-Based Approach
Consent-based facilities101 encourage communication and agreement 
by all affected units of government that are willing to accept a facility in 
their jurisdiction, including: the host state or tribe; regional and local 
authorities; and the host community.102 The BRC emphasized that the 
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process of finding locations for nuclear waste will only work if 
transparency, flexibility, patience, and a heavy emphasis on cooperation 
exists between all parties involved.103
In January 2016, the DOE launched its Consent-Based Siting 
Initiative.104 In order to find a content-based facility, the initiative consists 
of three phases: (1) an initial public engagement effort designed to solicit 
participant input on how to structure the consent-based process; (2) an 
effort to design a siting process based on input gathered during the first 
phase; and (3) further work with communities that might be interested in 
hosting a nuclear waste management facility.105 To further support the idea 
of consent-based facilities, United States Senator Catherine Masto noted
that local consent should be required for any nuclear repository or storage 
facility. Senator Masto stated, “It is unjust and unfair to force Nevadans to 
live next to a nuclear waste dump that could harm both their health and 
livelihood.”106 In order to encourage states to consent to a permanent 
repository, the federal government must offer incentives. 
2. Incentivizing the States to save America from Nuclear Destruction 
Critics of the compromise bill have advocated for a local consent-
based approach to finding a storage facility.107 Yucca Mountain receives
backlash as a geologic repository because the project is driven by state 
politicians rather than the actual people that will be affected by the 
selection of the location. The Blue Ribbon Commission and the DOE 
under President Obama both supported a consent-based approach for 
determining locations.108
The compromise bill contains infrastructure-related incentives meant 
to entice Nevada and ease its opposition to the repository. Heavy 
opposition by Nevada led the Obama administration to abandon the 
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approval process in the first place.109 While there are few specifics on these 
incentives, Congress has discussed the possibility that new infrastructure, 
schools, water rights, and financial incentives could potentially change 
Nevada’s perspective regarding Yucca as the nation’s permanent 
repository.110 The federal government should also provide economic 
incentives to States that are willing to house consolidated interim storage 
facilities or geologic repositories.111 These incentives could include 
federal tax breaks, infrastructure, schools, or funding for communities 
willing to house nuclear waste in an interim facility. Interim storage 
facilities are on the verge of becoming a reality, with firms seeking 
licenses from the NRC. 
a. Texas Firm Applies for Nuclear Waste License 
Private companies are currently seeking a license to operate an interim 
facility. A Texas company, Waste Control Specialists, LLC, has submitted 
an application to the NRC to construct and operate a large interim storage 
facility for commercial nuclear waste with the caveat that the DOE assume 
liability for the waste.112 A $5.2 billion facility in Andrews County, Texas 
capable of storing 40,000 metric tons of used nuclear waste petitioned the 
NRC for licensing.113 In order for the DOE to assume liability for the 
waste, Congress would need to amend the NWPA as discussed above.114
Waste Control Specialists, LLC, a treatment, storage, and disposal 
company dealing in radioactive and hazardous wastes, says the facility will 
implement dry cask storage115 identical to those used at nuclear plants but 
on a larger scale.116 The company will prioritize the waste from seven 
decommissioned nuclear plants across the United States.117
Part 72 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations gives NRC the 
authority to license and regulate spent fuel storage facilities.118 To approve 
this project, the NRC will conduct two parallel reviews: one for safety and 
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one for potential environmental impacts.119 Opposition to the Texas site is 
mounting. Antinuclear groups, Beyond Nuclear and Nuclear Information 
and Resource Service, and environmental group, Sustainable Energy and 
Economic Development (SEED) Coalition, asked the NRC to terminate 
review of the license application.120 The groups worry that the interim 
storage facility may become the de facto permanent home for the highly 
toxic waste.121 While these groups have a legitimate concern, the need to 
handle the United States nuclear waste crisis outweighs this potential 
problem.
Waste Control Specialists, LLC is not the only private company 
seeking a license to open an interim storage facility. Holtec International122
proposed a consolidated interim storage facility in southeast New 
Mexico.123 Holtec submitted its license application to the NRC on March 
31, 2017, with plans to use Hi-STORM UMAX124 technology to hold 
10,000 canisters of used nuclear fuel in a 288-acre underground facility 
until a permanent repository becomes available.125 Congress must amend 
the NWPA before the NRC can grant a license to either of these facilities. 
IV. HOLDING BLAME IN THE EVENT OF NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION:
LIABILITY OF INTERIM STORAGE FACILITIES
If Congress amends the NWPA to allow interim storage of nuclear 
waste, the problem of liability for the nuclear waste must be addressed. In 
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addition to the proposed permanent repository, the 1987 NWPA 
amendments originally sought to provide a solution to the nuclear waste 
problem with the creation of a Monitored Retrievable Storage facility 
(MRS).126 The MRS would temporarily hold the nuclear waste while the 
permanent repository remained under construction.127 Although the MRS 
creation failed, the 1987 NWPA amendments provided direction for a 
MRS facility that can be used for comparison for interim storage 
facilities.128 Under the original NWPA scheme, the DOE had the duty to 
construct and operate the MRS facility.129 The Secretary of Energy had to 
select a site and submit a license application to the NRC for the 
construction of the MRS facility.130
The statutes from the 1987 NWPA amendments governing the MRS 
are subject to many of the provisions set out in the statutes that govern the 
development of the permanent repository. The NWPA amendments 
specify that the Secretary of Energy will assist states in resolving liability 
concerns arising from nuclear accidents.131 The NWPA provided that the 
Price Anderson Act would cover any liability arising from an incident at a 
government MRS facility.132 Section 2210(d)(1)(B)(ii) states that any 
“[p]ublic liability arising out of nuclear waste activities . . . shall be 
compensated from the Nuclear Waste Fund . . . .”133 The Price Anderson 
Amendments Act of 1988 stated its intention that Price Anderson 
protection would apply to an MRS facility.134
The Price Anderson Act does not explicitly state that it will cover the 
liability of private facilities, but an examination of the relevant laws and 
regulations indicates that Price Anderson will cover these facilities.
Originally, the government required nuclear reactor sites to have insurance 
in the event of a disaster under the Price Anderson Act. Today, any private 
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entity planning to construct and operate an independent spent fuel storage 
facility must first obtain a license from the NRC.135 Under Price Anderson, 
the NRC may require licensees to maintain financial protection, likely in 
the form of private insurance.136 Section 2210(b) of 42 U.S.C. allows the 
NRC to adjust the amount of required insurance for licensees whose 
nuclear activities are not for the purpose of generating power.137 Thus, the 
NRC can regulate how much insurance a private interim facility would be 
required to have.
On the other hand, the Price Anderson Act, read literally, indicates that 
private interim facilities may not be indemnified. Section 2014(q) of the 
Act defines “nuclear incidents” as “any occurrence . . . causing sickness, 
disease or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property 
arising out of or from radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous 
properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material.”138 SNF may 
not be classified as “source, special nuclear or by-product material.”139
Any potential accident that may occur from spent nuclear fuel might not 
be protected under Price Anderson. However, the NRC should consider 
spent nuclear fuel as a “source material” for all intended purposes to keep 
in accordance with the spirit of the definition.140
The Price Anderson Act should work to indemnify the private interim 
facilities. Since these private facilities would operate to allow the federal 
government to end its breach of contracts with the reactor sites who paid 
into the Nuclear Waste Fund, it logically follows that the federal 
government would assist these facilities with liability protection by 
applying the Price Anderson Act.
V. A SAVIOR FROM NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION: THE POSSIBILITY OF FUEL 
REPROCESSING 
Alternatively, or possibly in addition to the creation of private interim 
facilities, one potential avenue to take regarding SNF is reprocessing.
Reprocessing is the treatment of SNF to allow it to be used again in the 
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nuclear process.141 France engages in fuel reprocessing “at a time when 
U.S. nuclear policy . . . has been locked in a state of perpetual 
indecision.”142 Fifty-eight power reactors generate over eighty percent of 
France’s electricity, with recycled nuclear fuel generating seventeen 
percent.143 A spokesman for France’s national electricity utility company, 
Electricité de France, explained that reprocessing, compared to the direct 
storage of the spent nuclear waste, is “a process that reduces by a factor of 
10 the volume of highly active long-lived waste.”144
France’s reprocessing system involves converting spent plutonium 
and uranium into a “mixed oxide” that can be reused in nuclear power 
plants to produce more electricity.145 France’s nuclear power plants ship 
the SNF to its recycling facility at Cap La Hague where it sits and cools 
down in demineralized water for three years. Afterward, the recycling 
process begins.146 The nuclear material that cannot be recycled is 
imbedded in glass logs where it remains until the country creates an 
underground repository for storage.147 It is important to note that a 
permanent repository is still necessary even if reprocessing begins in the 
United States, as some of the material cannot be recycled. 
President Reagan ended the freeze on reprocessing in the U.S., but
during this time the focus of SNF remained with building a repository.148
Without an obstacle, the DOE created the Global Nuclear Energy 
Partnership (GNEP) in 2006.149 The GNEP wanted to return nuclear 
energy on a larger scale by encouraging reprocessing.150 A major part of 
the GNEP would have the U.S. reentering the uranium business by 
“joining with other reprocessing countries such as Russia, United 
Kingdom, France, and Japan to provide enriched uranium obtained 
through reprocessing to nations that want to develop commercial nuclear 
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power, without their having to construct either uranium enrichment or 
reprocessing facilities.”151 The Obama Administration ended funding for 
the GNEP, but the organization still meets as an international network 
without the full support of the United States.152
Weapons proliferation is the primary concern with fuel reprocessing in 
the U.S.153 The pure plutonium is separated from the spent fuel and is 
commonly used to create nuclear weapons.154 In the post 9/11 world, 
terrorism is a concern. Skeptics believe that, if separated plutonium is 
shipped in commerce for reprocessing, terrorists could steal and potentially 
weaponize it.155 In reality, terrorists would likely not make the plutonium 
into a bomb because they would be exposed to harmful radiation when 
opening the plutonium vessel.156 A more likely scenario would be for 
terrorists to release the radioactive substance into the environment.157
However, even this threat is fairly remote. There are no instances of 
terrorists obtaining spent nuclear fuel, mainly due to the substantial cost and 
technical difficulty of doing so along with the effective oversight by national 
governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency.158
The U.S. should analyze what France spends on reprocessed fuel and 
try to remedy the problem before implementing it in practice. The U.S. can 
learn from France’s mistakes.159 Even with the argument of cost, the 
environmental benefits are high. Recycling used fuel saves approximately 
twenty-five percent of natural uranium resources and reduces the volume 
of end waste by a factor of five and its toxicity by a factor of ten.160 If 
Congress lifted the ban on nuclear fuel reprocessing, the U.S. could 
potentially cut the amount of nuclear waste requiring disposal by half.161
Advocates contend that reprocessing will provide “a plentiful, secure, 
long-term source of fuel for low-carbon nuclear power while significantly 
                                                                                                            
151. Id.
152. Id. at 252.
153. Id. at 46.
154. A. David Rossin, U.S. Policy on Spent Fuel Reprocessing: The Issues,
PBS ONLINE, https://perma.cc/9D46-JL5F (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Shughart, supra note 145.
159. Farah, supra note 14, at 204. 
160. The Advantages of Recycling, AREVA, https://perma.cc/3K48-92XZ (last 
visited Jan. 21, 2018).
161. Shughart, supra note 145.
268 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VII
reducing the volume of, and formidable technical and political challenges 
posed by nuclear wastes requiring repository disposal.”162
CONCLUSION
The United States must act to reduce the staggering amount of nuclear 
waste piling up around the country at nuclear plant sites. Congress should 
amend the NWPA to allow private facilities to begin accepting nuclear 
waste while the DOE decides the best option for a permanent nuclear 
repository. Although the government has spent a considerable amount of 
time and taxpayer money on Yucca Mountain, the environmental factors
demonstrate that the longevity of the site is questionable. The DOE should 
move toward the consent-based approach of selecting a permanent 
repository. If the federal government offers incentives for states to hold 
the country’s nuclear waste, a solution that does not involve forcing 
nuclear waste on a particular state is possible.
By keeping the private interim facilities linked to a permanent 
repository, the country remains at a standstill with no options. The NWPA 
currently does not allow private facilities to operate without the licensing 
of a permanent repository. Amending the NWPA to permit the creation of 
interim storage facilities will allow the United States to finally tackle the 
growing nuclear waste. 
While liability remains a concern for many states and potential private 
facilities, the Price Anderson Act could cover the facility from any 
damages that could possibly occur. A careful reading of the Act illustrates 
that private facilities are covered. The United States should also start a 
reprocessing program that mirrors France to deal with the nuclear waste 
crisis. If the United States begins a reprocessing program, the amount of 
nuclear waste would decrease and take up less space in a permanent 
repository. If the United States does not act soon, nuclear waste will 
remain the biggest threat to the safety of American citizens. 
Matthew James Braquet
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